Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect Whistleblowers? The Recent Experience of Companies and Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX by Mowrey, Megan E. et al.
William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 2 Article 5
Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect Whistleblowers? The
Recent Experience of Companies and
Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX
Megan E. Mowrey
L. Stephen Cash
Thomas L. Dickens
Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Repository Citation
Megan E. Mowrey, L. Stephen Cash, and Thomas L. Dickens, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect
Whistleblowers? The Recent Experience of Companies and Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX, 1 Wm. &
Mary Bus. L. Rev. 431 (2010), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol1/iss2/5
ESSAY
DOES SARBANES-OXLEY PROTECT
WHISTLEBLOWERS? THE RECENT EXPERIENCE
OF COMPANIES AND WHISTLEBLOWING
WORKERS UNDER SOX
MEGAN E. MOWREY*
L. STEPHEN CASH**
THOMAS L. DICKENS
ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) attempts to prevent fraud in the
business activities of public companies. SOX includes regulations
designed to protect whistleblowing employees that may be triggered if
workers allege fraudulent activity by their employers, and, in response,
their employers retaliate. This Essay discusses the strength of the
whistleblowing protection provided by SOX, the conduct covered by the
SOX whistleblower provisions, and specifically the application of the law
by the courts.
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the hope
that SOX would interrupt, check, and prevent illegal accounting practices
by public companies whose activities threatened investors.' In concert
with the Act's goals, protection is offered to the whistleblowing employee
who reports questionable practices. 2 A whistleblowing employee can
* J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Clemson University.
** J.D., LL.M., Professor, Clemson University.
*** Ph.D., Professor, Clemson University.
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives
for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91,
108-09 (2007) ("Primarily, SOX aims to transform corporate board members into active
managers rather than part-time monitors.").
2. SOX is not the only act to provide whistleblower protection. See, for example,
Section 1553 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which offers
protection to whistleblowers who report corruption that is associated with employers who
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supply important information about a company's actions: "Fraud and
accounting imbroglios come to light because of a tip (42.6%), internal
auditing (24.6%), accident (18%), outside auditors' discovery (16.4%),
and last of all, by virtue of an earlier-installed internal control (8.2%)." 3
The whistleblower's contribution to the process, therefore, can be vital.4
This Essay examines the impact of whistleblower protection under SOX,
focusing particularly on four federal circuit decisions that have addressed
the issue.
Most of the employees who have claimed whistleblower protection
have been dramatically unsuccessful. First, because the language of the
Act indicates that such protection does exist: "No [publicly traded com-
pany] ... may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other
manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the employee." 6 Second,
due to the at least initial belief by lawmakers, business people, account-
ants, attorneys, investors, or anyone with an interest in preventing cor-
porate fraud that not only was whistleblowing protection necessary, SOX
was the vehicle to provide it.
The actual result of the Act appears to have been much different.
Richard Moberly of the University of Nebraska School of Law, found that
out of the 491 filings by employees in the first three years after SOX was
enacted (2002-2005), 361 cases were actually resolved by the Occup-
ational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)-the federal agency
charged with the initial investigations of SOX whistleblower complaints-
and of those claims only 3.6% were successfully argued by the employee
(i.e., thirteen of the 361). 7 The employees who challenged the OSHA
decisions were successful 6.5% of the time when they appealed to a
have received stimulus funds. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (enacted Feb. 17, 2009), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11 congbills&docid=
f:hlenr.pdf.
3. Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate Govern-
ance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2006); Rapp,
supra note 1, at 109 n. 107 (discussing how light is being shed by more than one method).
4. Whistleblowers were primarily responsible for revealing the fraud at Enron
(Sherron Watkins) and WorldCom (Cynthia Cooper). James Fanto, Whistleblowing and
the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 438-39
(2004).
5. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 67 (2007).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
7. Moberly, supra note 5, at 67.
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Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (i.e., six of the ninety-
three appeals).8 Moberly found that far from helping employees whose
efforts might reveal their public companies' questionable conduct, SOX
failed to protect the employees it claimed to champion. 9 Moberly cites to
the Act's plain language and experts' opinions that SOX would revol-
utionize the approach to and protection of employees' conduct when
employees choose to disclose the illegal activities of their employers.
10
Nevertheless, SOX has not protected whistleblowers. Moberly's data
showing the number of unsuccessful employees was similarly found by
Mary Ramirez, who reports that:
As of May 31, 2006, the total number of SOX complaint determin-
ations was 702; of that number, 499 complaints had been dismissed, 93
were settled, 15 more were decided on the merits, and 95 complaints
were withdrawn. Thus, only [3%] of cases decided by DOL were
decided on the merits; if settled cases are added to those addressed on
the merits (assuming that settled cases have some merit), then less than
1 out of 5 complaints ... avoid dismissal. 1
Examining the early articles concerning SOX whistleblower protection,
there was a collective belief that the protection was assured, and that SOX
could prevent an Enron-type fiasco by shielding the whistleblower. 12 The
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at68-69.
11. Ramirez's data came from "an email from Nilgun Tolek, Director, Office of
Investigative Assistance, Department of Labor, to Thomas Hitchcock (June 12, 2006,
3:24 p.m. CST) (on file with [Ramirez])." Mary Kreimer Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle
on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183,
199-200 (2007) (internal citations omitted). The data is further supported in an article by
Tresa Baldas, Whistleblowing Protection under SOX is a 'Major Disappointment' for
Plaintiffs, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 31, 2007. Baldas states that of the approximately 1000
claims filed through October 2007, seventeen were decided on the merits, but only six of
these seventeen were decided in favor of the employee by an Administrative Law Judge,
according to the Department of Labor. See id.
12. See, e.g., Larry CatA Baker, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for
Officer, Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 897, 897 (2002);
Michael Delikat, Retaliation & Whistleblowing Claims in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 712
PLI/LIT 559, 570 (2004); Stephen Fraidin & Laura Mutterperl, Advice of Lawyers:
Navigating the New Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
609, 609 (2003); Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the
Shredder and the "Delete Key": §§ 802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 67, 89-91 (2004); Brooke Iley & Mark Blondman, An Employer's Guide
to Conducting Internal Investigations, CORP. COMPLIANCE & REG. NEWSL. (July 2006);
Katrina Campbell Randolph, Understanding How Employers Can Be Held Liable Under
Criminal Law, THE RECORDER, Mar. 22, 2007; A. Martin Wickliff, Jr. & Peter M.
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reality is that SOX has not delivered on this front-not to the employees,
the government, or the public.13
Data from Terry Dworkin at the University of Indiana, Kelley School
of Business, similarly shows that whistleblowers are virtually never
successful under SOX. 14 "Despite the intended promotion and use of
whistleblowing to help enforce Sarbanes-Oxley and deter wrongdoing in
the securities market, the statutory scheme gives the illusion of protection
without truly meaningful opportunities or remedies for achieving it."
15
Dworkin's sentiment is echoed by Ramirez, who states that, "[T]his
limited success for complainants suggests that many employees expecting
protection by SOX are not actually enjoying such protection."' 16
Although the whistleblowers' revelations can be significant, the
consequences of blowing the whistle may be deleterious to the employee
beyond losing his or her current job. Even if the employee can success-
fully obtain SOX protection, information concerning widespread fraud
may kill a firm, as was true at Enron, in which case there is neither a job to
come back to nor a source of damages when the company collapses.
17
Panken, Retaliation and Whistleblowing Protection-A New Tune from Sarbanes-Oxley,
in ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, 3 Employment and Labor Relations Law for the
Corporate Counsel and the General Practitioner (Apr. 2003).
13. Additionally, when Congress delivered SOX to President Bush, its passage was
accompanied by the President's use of a signing statement. President Bush said when he
signed SOX into law,
The legislative purpose of section 1514A ... is to protect against
company retaliation for lawful cooperation with investigations and not
to define the scope of investigative authority, [therefore] the executive
branch shall construe section 1514A(a)(1)(B) as referring to investiga-
tions authorized by the rules of the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives and conducted for a proper legislative purpose.
Statement by President George W. Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3763, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
543 (July 30, 2002). Ranurez states that, for SOX, "out of literally hundreds of reform
provisions, [the President] narrowed only whistleblower protection," further muddying
the waters as to the protection SOX provided, perhaps limiting it to protecting only those
whistleblowers who were cooperating with Congress. Ramirez, supra note 11, at 183
n.9.
14. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757,
1764 (2007).
15. Id. Dworkin cites to a study by Earle and Madek (as of 2006), finding that "of the
677 completed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints, 499 were dismissed and 95 were withdrawn."
Id. at 1757, 1764-65 (citing Beverly Earle and Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of
Whistleblowing Protection under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. Bus.
L.J. 1 (2007)).
16. Ramirez, supra note 11, at 200.
17. Rapp, supra note 1, at 95.
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Even if the firm survives, the whistleblower may be labeled as disloyal by
current or future employers, making one's current job, or securing a new
position, difficult.' 8 As noted, the safety net offered through SOX is
fundamentally of limited use to the whistleblower, who cannot count on
SOX protections. Nevertheless, SOX as written and applied does grant
some, albeit imperfect, assistance to the whistleblower who perseveres.
Very few cases involving SOX retaliation claims have made it to the
appellate courts. 19 The circuit courts' interpretation and application of the
Act help explain employees' difficulty in successfully mounting a SOX
retaliation complaint; some of this difficulty lies in both the approach of
the agencies charged with enforcing SOX as well as the courts' own
analyses of what is a protected activity under the Act. This Essay
examines four cases, focusing specifically on the courts' respective
interpretations of what is a protected whistleblowing activity under SOX.
The courts' general failure to classify the actions of an employee as
protected conduct (for which he or she should not have been dismissed)
establishes the primary obstacle to winning a whistleblower claim.
I. ALLEN V. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
Former employees of Stewart Enterprises, Inc., (Stewart) a public
company with offices throughout the United States, sued the company
under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 when they were fired by the
18. Id.
19. Four circuit court cases are discussed in this article: Allen v. Admin. Review Bd.,
514 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 2008); Livingston v. Wyeth, 520 F.3d 344, 346 (4th Cir.
2008); Platone v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 548 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2008); and Welch v. Chao,
536 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2008). Other cases decided by the circuit courts in this area
include: Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (employee's SOX
whistleblower claim denied); Harp v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.
2009) (employee's SOX whistleblower claim denied); Halloum v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
307 Fed.Appx. 106, 2009 WL 118960 (9th Cir. 2009) (employee's SOX whistleblower
claim denied); Bregin v. Liquidebt Sys., Inc., 548 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2008) (employee's
SOX whistleblower claim denied); Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008)
(compelling arbitration of employee's SOX whistleblower claim); Taylor v. Admin.
Review Bd., 288 Fed.App'x. 929, 2008 WL 3375098 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
regardless of whether the employee's activities were protected conduct under SOX
whistleblower provisions, employee failed to make a claim under the Act); Washington v.
Weaver, 2008 WL 4948612, slip op. (5th Cir. 2008) (employee's SOX whistleblower
claim denied). But see Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 2009 WL 2461906 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that employees engaged in conduct protected by SOX whistleblower
provisions and remanding the case to determine if this activity contributed to their
terminations).
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company after raising their concerns about the company's accounting
practices. In accordance with SOX, the former employees' claims were
ultimately heard by a Department of Labor (DOL) administrative law
judge who dismissed their complaints. 2 1 When appealed to the depart-
ment's Administrative Review Board, the complaints were dismissed
again.22 In the decisions reached by the Administrative Law Judge and the
Administrative Review Board, the former employees failed to establish
that they engaged in a protected activity under the Act; the company's
terminations of the employees were not, therefore, a violation of SOX.23
The Fifth Circuit affirmed these prior decisions under the following
facts. 2
4
The complainants, Laura Waldon, Patricia Allen, and Dana Breaux,
expressed concern to Stewart when the company's computer system
incorrectly calculated its customers' accounts. 25 Each of the three employ-
ees was responsible for using the accounting system and providing
26information that the system used. The errors had been discovered by
Stewart, and, while none of the complainants alleged that Stewart
intentionally overcharged its customers, they did express concern that
corrections to the accounting errors were "taking too long ... the delay
was due to Stewart's desire to keep the problem a secret, (and the
complainants) were concerned that Stewart might be overcharging
,,27customers who did not complain. The three employees expressed
concern that Stewart's activities posed a risk of violating Missouri and
Texas law as well as federal legislation protecting stockholders. 28
A further allegation of inappropriate company action came in
connection with a directive from the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC). 29 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 "prohibits publicly-traded
companies from recognizing sales revenues before they deliver merch-
andise to the customer." 30 The bulletin forced Stewart to change its
accounting practices, and complainant Waldon, in particular, became con-
20. Allen, 514 F.3d at 471, 475; Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. §
1514A (2006).
21. Allen, 514 F.3d at 477.
22. Id.
23. Id. at471.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at471-72.
27. Id. at 472.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id.
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cerned that the necessary changes at Stewart were not being made. 31 The
accounting reports for recognized sales revenue were not provided to the
SEC, nor did the bulletin require that the reports be supplied to the SEC.32
Waldon, nonetheless, believed that Stewart's activities were not in
compliance with the bulletin's directives. 33 Waldon told Stewart's Chief
Accounting Officer about her concerns. 34 As noted, the other two comp-
lainants, Allen and Breaux, were also worried about Stewart's accounting
practices, and similarly reported their concerns to Stewart through its
Director of Internal Audit.
3
As a result of their reports regarding accounting irregularities, the
complainants testified that, "they began to experience stonewalling and
resistance from the SSC (a division within Stewart, its Shared Service
Center)," within which they worked.36 Additionally, each experienced
"exclusion from emails and meetings, lack of notification of policy and
procedural changes, and delays in receiving responses from the SSC.
3 7
The complainants faced, therefore, "a hostile environment for engaging in
a protected activity."
38
According to the former employees, Stewart disingenuously claimed
that it fired the three employees as part of a reduction in force, but the
inclusion of the three in this reduction was actually explained by their
reporting of the accounting irregularities. 39 Stewart denied the allegations
and insisted that it based the terminations on "job functions rather than the
individuals in the jobs." 40 The former employees filed complaints through
the Department of Justice alleging that Stewart retaliated against them for
engaging in protected activity.4 1 The administrative law judge who heard
their claims dismissed them, and this result was repeated on appeal to the
Administrative Review Board.42 The Fifth Circuit then heard the case.43
The Fifth Circuit provided the relevant law governing Stewart's
alleged misconduct, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, which lays out the requirements
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 472.
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id. at 473.
38. Id. at 473-74.
39. Id. at 474.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 475.
42. Id. at471.
43. Id. at 476.
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for a civil action filed to protect against retaliation in fraud cases.4a In
addition, the Fifth Circuit noted the burden of proof in SOX whistleblower
cases as governed by section 1514A(b)(2)(c) of the Act:
To prevail, an employee must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer
knew that she engaged in the protected activity; (3) she suffered an
unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable action.
According to the court, employees will be protected when their engage-
ment in a protected activity contributes to an unfavorable, that is, an
adverse, employment action by their employer.
46
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
(a) Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded com-
panies.-No company with a class of securities registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the employee-
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341
[mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities
fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the
investigation is conducted by-
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or
such other person working for the employer who has the
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise
assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of
the employer) relating to an alleged violation of section 1341 [mail
fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud],
any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
See Sarbanes Oxley Act § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); see also Allen, 514 F.3d at
475.
45. Allen, 514 F.3d at 475-76. Under SOX, "the Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b),
governs SOX whistleblower actions." Id. at 475; see 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (b) (2000).
46. Allen, 514 F.3d at 476.
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The Supreme Court established the meaning of an adverse employ-
ment action in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White:
47
"Burlington held that 'a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this
context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
[engaging in the protected activity]."' 8 The Administrative Review Board
adopted the Supreme Court's definition of an adverse employment action
in Hirst v. Southeast Airlines, Inc.4 9 Hirst dealt with claims under the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century (AIR 21), which also governs SOX claims.5 ° The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Administrative Review Board that the Burlington standard
for adverse employment actions should be applied under SOX as well,51
specifically, "that an employee's reasonable belief must be scrutinized
under both a subjective and objective standard., 52
The Fifth Circuit stated that the Administrative Review Board's
decision would be affirmed "unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise contrary to law."' 53 Focusing on the prior rulings
in the case by an administrative law judge and the Administrative Review
Board, the Fifth Circuit held, consistent with these tribunals, that the
employees' actions were not protected activity as it is understood under
the Act, because the activity did not "'definitively and specifically relate'
to one of the six enumerated categories found in § 1514A: (1) 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (mail fraud); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1344
(bank fraud); (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities fraud); (5) any rule or
regulation of the SEC; or (6) any provision of federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders."
54
The Fifth Circuit held that an employer violates the SOX protections
by retaliating against the whistleblowing employee who tells a supervisor
of his or her concerns, "which the employee reasonably believes constitute
a violation of one of the six enumerated categories." 55 Consistent with the
47. Burlington & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
48. Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.2 (citing Burlington & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.
Ct. 2405, 2415 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
49. Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.2.
50. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2000); Hirst v. Se. Airlines, Inc., ARB Case No. 04-
116, 2007 WL 352447 (ARB Jan. 31, 2007).
51. Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.2.
52. Id. at 477.
53. Id. at 476 (citing Williams v. Admin. Review Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Macktal v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 171 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1999))).
54. Id. at 476-77.
55. Id. at 477 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006)).
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Supreme Court's analysis in Burlington regarding what is a reasonable
belief, the Fifth Circuit stated, "[t]he objective reasonableness of an
employee's belief is evaluated based on the knowledge available to a
reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same
training and experience as the aggrieved employee." 56 The court then
applied the principles it derived from the statute and prior case law to the
former employees' claims.
Turning first to complainant Waldon, the Fifth Circuit described
Waldon as a CPA, whose beliefs must be examined through the lens of
similar expert accounting professionals. 57 Waldon's complaints regarding
the Staff Accounting Bulletin concerned financial statements that would
not be submitted to the SEC; Waldon knew this and must have known it as
an accounting expert, according to the court.58 When she raised concerns
about Stewart's compliance with the Bulletin, her "general inquiries"
regarding compliance failed to constitute protected activity, primarily
because the report would never reach the SEC.59
Second, all of the employees voiced concerns about Stewart's
accounting practices, although the court thought that none could point to
one of the six enumerated categories announced in the statute. 60 The
former employees argued that they possessed the reasonable belief, "that
Stewart's conduct violated some unidentified federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders." 61 The employees' reasonable beliefs related, there-
fore, to the sixth category, that is, any provision of federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders. 62 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the statute's
plain language requires a finding that the company intended to commit a
fraud against its shareholders in order for the employer's conduct to
constitute a whistleblowing violation of SOX as retaliatory. 63 The Fifth
Circuit stated, "[T]he employee must reasonably believe that his or her
56. Id. The court also noted that a mistaken belief may still constitute protected
activity, as long as it is reasonable. Id. at 478 (referencing Collins v. Beazer Homes USA,
Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004) and Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB Case
No. 04-068, 2006 WL 3246900, at *5 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 31, 2006)).
57. Allen, 514 F.3d at 478-79.
58. Id. at 479.
59. Id. The reports would not be sent to the SEC, therefore the Fifth Circuit would
not classify Waldon's actions as falling into the fifth class of enumerated categories ("any
rule or regulation of the SEC"). 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006).
60. Allen, 514 F.3d at 479.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 479-80.
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employer acted with a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manip-
ulate, or defraud its shareholders."'
64
Regardless of whether Stewart's inattention to accounting irregular-
ities as raised by the employees might constitute negligence by Stewart,
the complainants could not reasonably have believed that Stewart's
actions were fraudulent, such fraudulent actions requiring scienter, not a
merely negligent act.65 The Fifth Circuit stated that the former employees
did not allege that Stewart intentionally manipulated its accounting data,
and each acknowledged that Stewart was attempting to rectify its account-
ing discrepancies;66 a reasonable person could not have concluded that
Stewart's actions were fraudulent, and neither could the complainants.
67
The former employees' actions were, therefore, unprotected activity.
68
In its defense, Stewart argued "it 'would have taken the same un-
favorable personnel action in the absence of that [protected] behavior,"
69
such a contributing factor being necessary to establish protection under the
Act for an adverse employment action precipitated by a protected
activity.70 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, "[a] contributing factor is 'any
factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, tends to affect in
any way the outcome of the decision."' 71 Since the actions of the emp-
loyees were not protected activity, however, it was unnecessary for the
employer to show necessity for the terminations independent of the
employees reporting behavior; the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision by
the Administrative Review Board and dismissed the complaints.
72
II. LIvINGSTON V. WYETH INCORPORATED
Mark Livingston worked for Wyeth, Inc. (Wyeth), a public pharm-
aceutical company, as Associate Director of Training and Continuous
Improvement. 73 Wyeth fired Livingston for "abusive and insubordinate
64. Id. at 480.
65. Id. at 480-81.
66. Id. at481.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 482.
69. Id. at 476 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2006)).
70. Id.
71. Id. n.3 (citing Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB Case No.
04-149, 2006 WL 3246904, at *13 (ARB May 31, 2006) (quoting Marano v. Dep't of
Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
72. Id. at 482-83.
73. Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344, 346 (4th Cir. 2008).
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conduct" in 2002.74 Livingston contended that his termination resulted
from his statements both to Wyeth's Office of Compliance and in a
memorandum in which Livingston reported that Wyeth could not meet
training requirements specified by Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations. 7 Wyeth required training for its emplo ,ees as necessary for
compliance with prior violations of FDA rules. Livingston became
concerned that Wyeth could not fulfill its obligations to train according to
the FDA requirements, and he reported his worries to Wyeth.77
While Wyeth met its requirements, and Livingston confirmed this
result, 78 Livingston was told by Wyeth's Human Resource office to "stop
making non-constructive comments, such as saying that the use of
'approved and verified training practices is defrauding the FDA,' and that
he '[riefrain from making negative and insulting comments regarding the
practices of other departments.' 79 Wyeth told Livingston that if Living-
ston would not sign a document that affirmed that he would desist from
making his statements, such a signature being required by Wyeth within
thirty days, Livingston would be terminated.8 Livingston refused to sign,
and Wyeth fired him.
81
Information about the circumstances of Livingston's termination also
revealed that Livingston had a troubled history with Wyeth, including
being "formally warned for the use of 'foul and abusive language and
unprofessional behavior' toward subordinates." 82 Livingston's employ-
ment relationship with Wyeth finally ended after a confrontation at a
company holiday party.
83
When terminated, Livingston filed a complaint through the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) claiminf that Wyeth violated the whistleblower
protection provisions of SOX.8 Wyeth's claim was heard by the federal
district court when the DOL failed to reach a final decision within the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 350. FDA regulations specified that, "'[e]ach person engaged in the manu-
facture ... of a drug product shall have education, training, and experience' sufficient to
perform the functions assigned to them." Id. at 347 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 211.25 (1995)).
76. Id. at 347.
77. Id. at 347-48.
78. Id. at 348-49.
79. Id. at 349 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
442
DOES SOX PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS?
statutory time requirements. The district court dismissed the case in favor
of Wyeth.85 Livingston appealed.86
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Livingston's statements to Wyeth and its
personnel regarding Livingston's belief that Wyeth might fail to fulfill its
training obligations as prescribed by the FDA.s7 Livingston characterized
his statements as protected activity and the reason for his termination by
Wyeth when the company sought to shut Livingston's protests down.
88
The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that Livingston's statements were
not protected activity.
89
According to the Fourth Circuit, Livingston could establish a claim
only if he proved the following elements:
(1) [H]e provided information or a complaint to a Wyeth supervisor or
to one authorized to investigate and correct misconduct; (2) the
information or complaint regarded conduct that he reasonably believed
constituted a violation of an enumerated statute or any regulation
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to
fraud; (3) his employer discharged him or took other unfavorable
personnel action against him; and (4) his providing the information or
making the complaint was a contributing factor to his discharge or
other adverse employment action taken by Wyeth.93
As was true in Allen, the Fourth Circuit referred to the complainant's
subjective and objective reasonable belief that the employer's actions
violated the law: "Livingston must show not only that he believed that the
conduct constituted a violation, but also that a reasonable person in his
position would have believed that the conduct constituted a violation."
91
The Fifth Circuit advised that the belief must encompass a current or past
violation, not the possibility that a company might commit a violation.
In Livingston's case, Livingston failed to show that he either believed
that that the company was violating or did violate the law, or that the
85. Id. (citing Livingston v. Wyeth, No. 1:03CV00919, 2006 WL 2129794, at *15
(M.D.N.C. July 28, 2006)).
86. Id. at 350.
87. Id. at 350-51.
88. Id. at 350.
89. Id. at 353.
90. Id. at 351-52.
91. Id. at 352. The Fourth Circuit references both a subjective and objective belief,
which were also contemplated by the Allen court in the Fifth Circuit. Allen v. Admin.
Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008). See generally Courtney J. Anderson
DaCosta, Stitching Together the Patchwork: Burlington Northern's Lessons for State
Whistleblower Law, 96 GEO. L.J. 951 (2008).
92. Livingston, 520 F.3d at 352 (citing Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d
332, 340-41 (4th Cir. 2006)).
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company's potential noncompliance with the FDA regulations posed a
simultaneous violation of the Securities and Exchange Act, or one of the
enumerated sections specified under SOX. 9 3 At no time did Livingston
articulate concerns for which an SEC violation might be raised.94 A
reasonable employee could not have concluded that Wyeth's actions viol-
ated securities law, and neither could Livingston, according to the Fourth
Circuit.95 Livingston did not allege that Wyeth concealed or manipulated
training data,96 that Wyeth was not complying with FDA directives,97 that
shareholders were being misled regarding the training, or that SEC
regulations were violated. 99 The Fourth Circuit stated:
In sum, not one link in Livingston's imaginary chain of horribles was
real or was in the process of becoming real. The only fact about which
Livingston ever complained was the fact that the training system for
good manufacturing practices was off schedule ... Livingston has failed
to produce evidence that he provided information or made a complaint
to Wyeth about conduct which a reasonable employee in his position
could have believed at the time constituted a violation of the securities
laws. 100
Regarding Wyeth's FDA compliance efforts, the Fourth Circuit noted
that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 required that
false statements to the SEC must be material misstatements: "'[T]here
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.' 10 1 Because the FDA
never took, nor threatened to take, actions against Wyeth regarding its
training compliance, Wyeth's financial health was never in jeopardy. 0 2
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) ("[T]o provide information, cause information to
be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343
[wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders . (emphasis added)); Livingston, 520 F.3d at 353.
94. Livingston, 520 F.3d at 356.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id. at 353-54.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 355-56.
101. Id. at 355 (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
102. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit then affirmed the district court's dismissal of Living-
ston's suit.'
0 3
I. WELCH V. CHAO
In Welch v. Chao,1°4 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the previous decision
reached by the Administrative Review Board (ARB), holding that David
Welch, a former employee of Cardinal Bankshares Corporation (Cardinal),
failed to establish whistleblower protection under SOX. 10 5 Welch, a CPA
and Cardinal's prior CFO, had alleged that several of Cardinal's account-
ing practices did not conform with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP), that Cardinal failed to correct the accounting problems
Welch identified, and that Cardinal did not reveal corrected financial
reports to the SEC when the reports were revised. 10 6 Welch furthermore
claimed that Ronald Leon Moore, CEO of Cardinal, excluded Welch from
communications between Cardinal and Larrowe & Co., Cardinal's inde-
pendent auditor, which compromised Welch's ability both to perform as
CFO and to accurately examine Cardinal's financial reports.
10 7
Welch explained all of his concerns to Moore and to others associated
with Cardinal, and he refused to certify certain financial records sent to the
SEC due to the problems he identified.10 8 Welch's claims were then
investigated by Cardinal through its Board of Directors. 10 9 Welch sub-
sequenttly informed "senior personnel" at Cardinal "that three Cardinal
employees were 'parties to fraudulent acts,' outlined his belief that
Cardinal's accounting practices violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and pro-
posed that he leave Cardinal quietly upon receipt of a generous severance
package."
10
Welch was suspended by the Board and ultimately fired after the
Board heard negative reports about Welch's conduct from the legal
counsel representing Cardinal's audit committee and from Cardinal's
outside auditor.111 The Board agreed with the conclusions of the attorney
and the auditor that "Welch's concerns ... lacked merit [and that] Welch
103. Id. at 356.
104. Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2008).
105. Id. at 272.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 272-73.
108. Id. at 273.
109. Id. at 274.
110. Id. The last accusation here, concerning the suggestion of a severance payment,
may have made it easier for the court to rule in favor of Cardinal and against Welch.
111. Id.
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had seriously breached his fiduciary duty to Cardinal by refusing to meet
with [the legal counsel or independent auditor] to discuss his charges
,,112
Welch filed charges in response to his termination, alleging that the
firm wrongfully discharged him in violation of the SOX protections for
whistleblowing employees. 113 The ARB found on review that Welch had
neither engaged in conduct protected by the Act nor had Welch made a
valid case under the whistleblower protections of the statute. 11
4
In the Fourth Circuit's appeal, the court repeated the protections
available to workers under SOX and reviewed the SOX provisions under
18 U.S.C. § 1514A.115 Before presenting its substantive analysis of
Welch's appeal, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether Welch's
conduct constituted protected activity under SOX. 116 The court stated that,
according to SOX, a protected employee must demonstrate "that he had
both 'a subjective belief and an objectively reasonable belief that the
conduct he complained of constituted a violation of relevant law."' 1 7 The
court held that Welch could not demonstrate an objective belief that
Cardinal's conduct was improper." 8 The Fourth Circuit also held that
Welch could not conform to SOX's requirement that his "communications
to his employer 'definitely and specifically relate' to one of the listed laws
[under SOX] for these communications to constitute protected activity." 119
The Fourth Circuit at least partially agreed with the ARB's rationale
for deciding that Welch's communications were not protected conduct;
namely, Welch could not show, "how he could have had an objectively
reasonable belief that these actions violated any of the laws listed [under
18 U.S.C. § 1514A]."' 2 ° More specifically, the court explained that
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 275.
115. Id. The court also stated in its decision that, "we may only disturb the ARB's
decision if it was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law ....'" Id. at 275-76 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)). The court
did not find a reason to disturb the decision and proceeded to affirm the ARB's ruling.
Id. at 279.
116. Id. at 276.
117. Id. at 275 (citing to Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc. 520 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2008)).
118. Id. at 276 n.3.
119. Id. at 276. The listed, unlawful acts under SOX include mail fraud, wire fraud,
bank fraud, securities fraud, the violation of any SEC rule or regulation, or federal laws
addressing fraud against shareholders of a public company. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343,
1344, 1348 (2000 & Supp. 2009).
120. Welch, 536 F.3d at 278.
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Cardinal did not violate federal securities law through its conduct.121
Although Welch made new allegations in this regard on appeal to the
Fourth Circuit, the court stated that these new arguments would not be
heard because the arguments were never raised prior to the ARB
review.122 The Fourth Circuit then affirmed the ARB's ruling.
123
IV. PLATONE V. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
In Platone,124 an employee, Stacy Platone, who originally worked for
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), was hired by Atlantic Coast Airlines
(ACA) as a manager of labor relations. 125 She began to notice discrepan-
cies in the airline flight loss procedures, whereby pilots were reimbursed
for scheduled days lost when they had to attend union meetings. 126 The
procedures called for pilots to be reimbursed only for days on which they
were scheduled to fly.127 Some pilots, however, were scheduling flights on
days for which they were not originally scheduled to fly-thereby getting
paid for days they would normally be off anyway.128 Plaintiff brought this
issue to the attention of her supervisors and was told ACA would be
reimbursed by the ALPA. 129 She was not satisfied with the ACA's
response and brought the issue up with ACA's Director of Employment
Services.' There was no indication that fraud was specifically discussed
at these meetings.' 3' Platone was fired shortly thereafter, allegedly over
her relationship with a pilot who had been a member of the ACA
management team. 132
Platone filed a whistleblower action under SOX with OSHA. 133 The
administrative law judge found that there was a fraudulent scheme to
compensate the pilots with the hope of getting concessions from the union,
and these actions would of necessity involve using mail and wire
121. Id. at 278-79.
122. Id. at 279.
123. Id.
124. Platone v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 548 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 622 (2009).
125. Id. at 323.
126. Id. at 324.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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services.134 The judge found that her complaints were a contributing factor
in her dismissal, were impossible to separate from any legitimate reasons
for her firing, and that her actions were protected activities within the
meaning of SOX.
13 5
The union filed an appeal with the Labor Department's Administrative
Review Board (ARB). 136 The ARB found that the meetings and emails
were not sufficient communication to specifically indicate possible fraud
against shareholders, and that the real victim was the ALPA, not share-
holders. 137 Thus, the plaintiff failed to "provide ACA with specific infor-
mation relating to protected activity under § 15 14A(a)(1) ...."138
Platone appealed the ARB decision. 139 The Fourth Circuit stated that
their review was de novo, and the court said it was limited to determining
if the ARB's findings were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law." 140 If the findings were supported
by substantial evidence, the decision must be upheld. 141
The court then agreed with the ARB that the evidence failed to show
that the plaintiff made any allegation of possible fraud against the
shareholders. 142 The Fourth Circuit also agreed with the ARB that
Platone's actions amounted to no more than informing management of an
internal billing issue, and SOX did "not afford her whistle-blower
protection.' ' 143 Thus, this case further illustrates the limits on protection
afforded the whistleblowing employee under SOX when the employee
cannot establish that he or she engaged in an activity sheltered by SOX.
CONCLUSION
The protection provided to whistleblowers in SOX might be important
in some instances, but, this protection is restrictive in application as
demonstrated by the courts' interpretation of protected conduct in recent
134. Id.
135. Id. at 324-25
136. Id. at 325.
137. Id.
138. Id. The review board appears to be continuing its position taken in earlier
decisions. See supra note 19.
139. Platone, 548 F.3d at 322.
140. Id. at 326. The court also stated that they must give a degree of deference to the
AIJ's factual findings. Id.
141. Id. ("Substantial evidence is that which is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."').
142. Id.
143. Id. at 327.
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cases. There are numerous hurdles placed in the way of a plaintiff before
any protection is available to the whistleblower. SOX notes, and the courts
have repeated that, first, a violation of a specific act must be communi-
cated by the whistleblower to the proper authorities. Second, this act must
be shown to be detrimental to shareholders. Third, the actions of the
whistleblower must be protected activities under SOX. Fourth, the
whistleblower's action must have led to his or her being discharged or
otherwise treated in a detrimental fashion. Each element is critical and
may be difficult to establish, as illustrated in this Essay by the courts'
treatment of protected activities. Only then will the whistleblower's
conduct result in protection by any tribunal that hears the issue.
